The Machine - A Truth Seekers Novel Order Printed Copy
- Author: Bill Myers
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About the Book
"The Machine" follows a group of teenagers who stumble upon a mysterious machine that can grant their wishes, but at a great cost. As they uncover the dark secrets behind the machine and its creator, they must decide if the power it offers is worth the price of their humanity. The novel explores themes of sacrifice, morality, and the consequences of seeking power.
Hannah More
Beyond any doubt, Hannah More was the most influential female member of the Society for Effecting the Abolition of the African Slave Trade. She was educated at Bristol, an important slave-trading town, and began to publish her writing in the 1760s, while she was still a teenager. Her first play, The Inflexible Captive, was staged at Bath in 1775. Later in the 1770s, and for much of the 1780s, she spent time in London and made the acquaintance of many important political and society figures, including Samuel Johnson, Edmund Burke, and Elizabeth Montagu. Her play Percy was produced by David Garrick in 1777, and Fatal Falsehood was staged in 1779, but she came to regard the theatre as morally wrong, especially after the death of her mentors; Garrick and Johnson. She turned to religious writing, beginning with her Sacred Dramas in 1782. In 1784-5, she 'discovered' Ann Yearsley, the so-called 'poetical milkmaid of Bristol', whose poems More helped to publish, although the two later fell out.
In the 1780s, More widened her circle to include religious and philanthropic figures, including John Newton, Beilby Porteus and William Wilberforce. In the summer of 1786, she spent time with Sir Charles and Lady Margaret Middleton at the their home in Teston in Kent. Among their guests were the local vicar James Ramsay and a young Thomas Clarkson, both of whom were central to the early abolition campaign. More and Clarkson met again in Bristol in 1787, while he was on his fact-finding mission to the city, but they did not become close. However, in the same year More met Wilberforce, and their friendship was to become a deep and lasting one. More contributed much to the running of the newly-founded Abolition Society including, in February 1788, her publication of Slavery, a Poem which has been recognised as one of the more important slavery poems of the abolition period. Her relationship with members of the society, especially Wilberforce, was close. For example, she spent the summer of 1789 holidaying with Wilberforce in the Peak District - planning for the abolition campaign, at that time at its height, formed a great deal of their conversation.
By the mid-1790s, More had become closely involved with the 'Clapham Sect' of evangelical Christians, many of whom were involved in the abolition campaign. The group centred on Henry Thornton's home in Clapham and included Wilberforce, James Stephen, and Zachary Macaulay, among others. Throughout the 1790s, she wrote a number of religious tracts, known as the Cheap Repository Tracts, that eventually led to the formation of the Religious Tracts Society. Several of the Tracts oppose slavery and the slave trade, in particular, the poem The Sorrows of Yamba; or, The Negro Woman's Lamentation, which appeared in November 1795 and which was co-authored with Eaglesfield Smith. However, the tracts have also been noted for their encouragement of social quietism in an age of revolution. She continued to oppose slavery throughout her life, but at the time of the Abolition Bill of 1807, her health did not permit her to take as active a role in the movement as she had done in the late 1780s, although she maintained a correspondence with Wilberforce and others. In her later life, she dedicated much time to religious writing. Nevertheless, her most popular work was a novel, Coelebs in Search of a Wife, which appeared in two volumes in 1809 (and which ran to nine editions in 1809 alone). In the 1820s she grew gradually less well, and decreased - but did not entirely halt - the amount of writing she produced. On her death in 1833, she left more than ĂÂŁ30,000 to charities and religious societies (equivalent to about ĂÂŁ2,000,000 or $3,000,000 in 2004).
Š Brycchan Carey 2004
What Is Lifeâs Ultimate Good
Dear Dan, I agree; any view that has God as the foundation of morality â like the Christian view I described in my last letter â will have further, serious issues to address. In fact, your two objections get at the most central ones. Let me respond to both. What Makes Godâs Laws Good? Your first objection has a great pedigree and can be traced all the way back to Plato. Namely, what makes Godâs moral laws â his moral values â good? Does he like these laws because they are good? Or are they good because he likes them? Either way seems to spell trouble for Christianity. Take the first option. Are Godâs laws good because they meet some separate standard of good, one âoutsideâ of God? If so, God has to defer to â is beholden to â some higher authority. And thatâs impossible, according to Christianity. But the alternative seems just as bad. If Godâs laws are good because he likes them, it makes morality seem arbitrary, dependent merely on his personal tastes or whims. After all, what if he had preferred things like murder, rape, and torture? Would these therefore be good? Do we really want to define âgoodâ as âwhat God likes,â similar to the way âcoolnessâ is just whatever the cool kids like? Wouldnât this rob statements like âGod is goodâ of all significance, reducing them to saying merely that âGod is the way he isâ? Again, neither choice looks very promising. So, which horn of the dilemma should the Christian choose? Goodness Is Godness I think the second option is the right one: Godâs laws are good because he likes them. That is, anything that God likes or values is good by definition. Goodness just is Godness. So then, is the phrase âGod is goodâ nothing but an empty tautology, saying no more than âGod is Godâ? âAnything that God likes or values is good by definition. Goodness just is Godness.â Well, no. In this specific context, where weâre defining âgood,â âGod is goodâ tells us something informative â namely, that Godâs values are what make things morally good. But in most other contexts, when we say, âGod is goodâ we can generally take for granted which properties or characteristics go on the âgoodâ list. In these ordinary cases, âGod is goodâ expresses something different â for example, âHereâs what God is like: he hates lying, murder, stealing â things we all agree are bad.â But then, if goodness is defined as whatever God likes, doesnât my view mean that murder and rape would have been good if God had liked them? In a sense, perhaps; at least their advocacy would have been included in his moral laws. But remember that weâre currently defining âgood,â and I think some of the rhetorical force of the wouldnât-rape-therefore-be-good objection comes from ignoring this context. After all, it seems that regardless of what we say ultimately âmakesâ something good, if that âgood-makerâ were different, good would be different. And in any case, the traditional Christian view of God holds that he couldnât have liked these things, that itâs logically impossible for God to be different than he is, just as a square couldnât fail to have four equal sides. It turns out, therefore, that things arenât as nearly as bad as the objection initially implied. Why Follow Godâs Moral Law? Then thereâs your second objection: why should we follow Godâs laws? Is it because, if we donât, heâll submit us to everlasting punishment? Should we follow Godâs laws simply to avoid pain? Does it turn out, after all, that morality is merely a matter of might makes right? Well, I think Christians should acknowledge that avoiding pain and suffering is a good reason to follow Godâs moral laws. Moreover, I concede that this would be a genuine problem â if this were the only reason for obeying God. And as I said, even this reason isnât without its virtues. After all, if we think of God as a parent â which the Bible encourages us to do â itâs a perfectly good reason, morally as well as rationally. As children we often obeyed our parents, in part, to avoid discipline. In fact, this was the reason for discipline in the first place â to help motivate us to obey. But of course, our obedience wasnât merely motivated by a fear of discipline. We also obeyed our parents because we loved and trusted them. We knew that their requirements were an integral part of their deep love and affection for us, that they gave us these rules to benefit us. Their laws were evidence of our parentsâ love. This interweaving of love and law, this close relation between our love for our parents, their love for us, and their moral values (that is, their moral loves) usually resulted in us adopting their morals; their values naturally became our values. We liked these values. And it didnât stop with moral values; we sometimes adopted our parentsâ values about sports teams, movies, and music â again, sometimes simply because we loved them. So, according to my view, we ought to follow Godâs laws because, ultimately, we want to â and the main reason we want to is that we love him. In this way, morality is ultimately personal and grounded in what we love. Meaning of Life The personal aspect of value isnât limited to moral value; itâs a component of all value, including lifeâs ultimate value. What we might call lifeâs ultimate meaning or purpose is perhaps the most important topic of all. So, what is our ultimate value, meaning, purpose, or goal in life? Well, suppose youâre right that thereâs no God. The meaning of life, then, would be like all value in a godless cosmos: subjective and relative. And because each person has his own values, there would be as many meanings of life as there are persons. In such a world, there would be no objective meaning that life has. But according to Christianity, humans have been made for something, for a purpose. Moreover, this purpose does not depend on us, and so, in this sense, itâs objective, human-independent. And because we were designed for a specific purpose, humans will only truly flourish and thrive by fulfilling this purpose. Fulfilling Godâs purpose for us is lifeâs ultimate meaning. That doesnât mean that, in a world without God, humans could not find some measure of meaning or value in things like family, work, art, gardening, or whatever. But unless these individual goods are put into the context of the much larger, overall purpose, they will never be as meaningful (to us) as they could be. Only by fulfilling this ultimate purpose is our meaning of life maximized. What Are Humans For? What is this larger context or purpose? What were we made for? We find a hint by noticing that, for many of us, relationships and community are what we most value, where we find our greatest fulfillment. We flourish best in community with people we love. And this fact is entirely in line with the Christian view that our ultimate purpose is to know and love the ultimate Person, God himself. Christianity is of one voice on this. As one famous confession says, our ultimate purpose âis to glorify God and enjoy him forever.â Indeed, God is a loving relationship, as odd as that sounds. The mysterious doctrine of the Trinity says that the Godhead is an intimate community of three (divine) persons. Thatâs what he is. (This is one reason why monistic religions canât truly make sense of the view that God is love: Who was God loving before he created persons other than himself? Such a being couldnât essentially be love; at best, he would need creatures in order to love.) âOur ultimate purpose is to know and love the ultimate Person, God himself.â Notice that the centrality of relationships is also evident when Jesus sums up all of Godâs laws in just two: love God and love your neighbor. The moral law â and, not coincidentally, lifeâs ultimate meaning â is about relationships, both human and divine. God, then, created humans for his own purpose. Our purpose â the meaning of life â is also importantly objective, just as morality is: it is human-independent. Yet itâs obvious that we can and do reject Godâs purpose for us. In fact, the gospel message â and the entire Bible â is predicated on such rejection. But God has given us another chance to truly flourish, to find ultimate meaning through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. He has made this possible at an immense cost to himself. Dan, I get why you would reject Christianity, viewing it as you do from the outside. I hope youâll continue to consider all this and at least begin to sense that genuine atheism might be a lot different from your current âkinder, gentlerâ version. I also hope that in the process youâll reconsider Christianityâs claims â in particular, Jesusâs offering of himself and the relationship you were made for. Article by Mitch Stokes